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Preface
The SEC Practice Section was founded in 1977 as a voluntary 
organization o f CPA firms striving for professional excellence in the 
auditing services they provide to Securities and Exchange Commis­
sion (SEC) registrant companies. It is part o f the Division for CPA Firms 
o f the American Institute o f CPAs (AICPA) —  the national professional 
association o f almost 300,000 CPAs in public practice, industry, gov­
ernment and education —  and is overseen by the Public Oversight 
Board.
The Section (or the "SECPS") imposes membership requirements 
and administers two fundamental programs to assure that SEC regis­
trants are audited by accounting firms with adequate quality control 
systems: (1) peer review, through which Section members have their 
practices reviewed every three years by other accountants, and (2) 
quality control inquiry, through which allegations o f audit failure con­
tained in litigation filed against member firms are reviewed to deter­
mine if the firms' quality control systems require corrective measures.
The Public Oversight Board-(the "POB" or "Board") is an autono­
mous body consisting o f five members with a broad spectrum of 
business, professional, regulatory and legislative experience. The 
Board's primary responsibility is to assure that the public interest is 
carefully considered when (1) the SECPS sets, revises and enforces 
standards, membership requirements, rules and procedures, and (2) 
the Section's committees consider the results o f individual peer re­
views and the possible implications o f litigation alleging audit failure. 
To preserve its independence and objectivity, the Board appoints its 
own members, chairman and staff, and establishes its own compen­
sation and operating procedures.
The accounting profession’s self-regulatory programs are remark­
ably effective in ensuring quality audits. However, no method o f 
regulation can prevent human failure, and occasional breakdowns 
occur. In the event o f an audit failure, injured parties and regulatory 
agencies take steps to identify and punish those responsible. And it is 
the role o f the self-regulatory system to assure that corrective actions 
are taken to prevent further harm.
i
The self-regulatory system should be better understood both by 
people who perform audits and by those who rely on "auditors' re­
ports." The Board has published this monograph to facilitate under­
standing o f the heretofore most confidential and controversial aspect 
o f the self-regulatory process —  the inquiry into alleged audit failures 
by the Quality Control Inquiry Committee. We believe the present 
structure o f the profession s self-regulatory process cannot be fully 
understood without a knowledge o f QCIC’s history. This monograph 
provides that history.
ii
Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION
The AICPA Division for CPA firms and its programs and require­
ments are the invention o f the AICPA membership, a self-regulatory 
program for which that membership can take great credit. But an im­
portant part o f that self-regulatory program, the Quality Control In­
quiry Committee (originally named the Special Investigations Com­
mittee), is one for which the membership cannot take sole credit.1 
Establishing an investigatory process to review allegations o f audit 
failure held the possibility o f increasing the firm's risk o f unsuccessfully 
defending its performance in litigation proceedings and thus quite 
properly concerned members o f the profession. It is questionable 
whether the leadership o f the profession could have succeeded in 
establishing such a process without outside support. In any event, 
that leadership turned to the independent Public Oversight Board for 
assistance in the task.
As early as March 1978, when the POB first met, the SEC Practice 
Section Executive Committee asked the Board to consider the follow­
ing issues: whether member firms should be disciplined in the event 
o f audit failure, and, if so, whether disciplinary action should proceed 
when litigation is threatened or pending. The POB studied these ques­
tions in depth, exploring the numerous related issues with legal counsel 
and with leaders o f the profession. The Board's influence proved cru­
cial. Much impressed by then POB Vice-Chairman Ray Garrett's anal­
1The committee's name was changed by the SECPS Executive Committee at its 
December 6, 1988 meeting, because the former name was considered misleading. 
An investigatory committee is generally perceived as intended to pass judgment on 
events and the responsibility for them. That was never intended to be the primary 
mission of this committee which is and always has been to gain assurance in the 
light of adverse allegations whether a firm's quality control system is adequate and 
being complied with. Hence, the name, "Quality Control Inquiry Committee," more 
appropriately describes this mission, nevertheless, at times in this monograph we 
refer to the committee as the Special Investigations Committee (the "SIC"), be­
cause throughout most of the evolving history of the committee it was called by 
that name. We recognize the confusion this may cause readers, but because the 
original name of the committee contributed significantly to the difficulty some firms 
faced in working with the committee, we have used Special Investigations Committee 
(SIC) and Quality Control Inquiry Committee (QCIC) interchangeably.
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ogy to government investigation o f airplane accidents, the Board 
proposed that the emphasis be on remedy when reviewing the alle­
gations o f audit failure rather than on punishment. This was a turning 
point in rallying the necessary support o f the profession to establish 
the Special Investigations Committee and its operating charge.
Out o f the POB's extensive deliberations emerged somewhat more 
complex conclusions. First, the public would be best served if the 
Section's emphasis were on prophylactic or remedial measures than 
on punishment. Second, a permanent committee (the Special Inves­
tigations Committee) should be formed to inquire into the implica­
tions o f alleged audit failures to determine whether specific remedial 
measures directed to the individual auditors or their firm were neces­
sary, and whether auditing standards and supporting literature should 
be revised. Third, the committee should proceed with its inquiries 
promptly regardless o f any possible impact on litigation. Fourth, in 
egregious cases, the committee might inquire into responsibility for 
audit deficiencies and recommend appropriate punishment to the 
executive committee. It is surely not too much to say that the POB's 
participation and moral force brought the SIC into existence more 
quickly and in more decisive form than could otherwise have been 
possible.
Those involved in the POB's activities at that time recall that al­
most everyone concerned viewed the prospect o f SIC actions with 
trepidation. On the one hand was the fear that the committee might 
do too little and thereby appear ineffective, bringing criticism to the 
entire self-regulatory effort. If credibility with the SEC and Congress 
were lost, the possible results could be most unfortunate. Yet an overly 
zealous committee could do much damage to the best interests of 
firms in litigation without contributing anything substantial to the public 
interest.
In the words o f one o f those associated with the process from 
the beginning:
From my own vantage point, I look back with amazement at what 
has been accomplished. A carefully thought out approach was 
developed after much consultation and consideration of all views.
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Then, responsible men struggled with the day-to-day SIC process 
under the scrutiny and frequent comments of the FOB and its 
staff. Changes were made and procedures were tightened up. But 
our worst fears did not come to pass. Instead, an institutionalized 
procedure has developed and been accepted as a fair and practi­
cal balance of interests, notwithstanding the slowness of the SEC 
to recognize it. In my view, it is a major achievement and both the 
public and the profession have been well served.
This brief monograph describes the process and some o f the 
events by which the Special Investigations Committee o f the SEC 
Practice Section was founded, developed, and accepted by the pro­
fession and the public.
Purpose of this Monograph
At the time o f this writing, the committee seems solidly estab­
lished. It is now accepted by most member firms as an integral part 
o f the self-regulatory  program, and is well thought o f by those rela­
tively few who are familiar with its activities. Why then trouble our­
selves to write or read this brief history o f the Quality Control Inquiry 
Committee? A number o f reasons come to mind.
Perhaps most important to us is our conviction that the Section's 
self-regulatory program is still in a process o f development. Efforts to 
improve that program are continuing and significant. Lest those who 
are not familiar with its history mistake legitimate attempts at im­
provement for criticisms o f its effectiveness, or attempt modifications 
o f the present program that are out o f character with its purpose and 
experience, we think it well to memorialize that experience while it is 
still fresh in memory so it can be reviewed as a basis for further con­
structive experimentation.
Also, we believe that heroes should be recognized. The early 
members o f the committee were faced with some extremely difficult 
assignments and occasionally their activities were viewed by many 
with skepticism and by some with acrimony. The first chairman o f the 
QCIC, Rholan E. Larson, provided the capable leadership the commit­
tee needed at its inception. The names o f those who served with him
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are listed in the Appendix. Mr. Larson was succeeded by equally com­
petent chairmen, Robert A. Mellin and William D. Hall. The aforemen­
tioned appendix also includes the names o f all the members o f this 
committee from inception through the date o f the writing o f this 
monograph. Each member o f that committee in his own way contrib­
uted directly to the success o f the committee's work; each o f them 
served his profession well. Without general recognition or compensa­
tion, yet for the love o f their profession and with a strong belief that 
the public was entitled to the best the profession could offer, they 
carried on, persevering in a task they had not asked for nor desired.
In the larger picture, the Special Investigations Committee and 
its evolution constitute a revealing example o f how a profession, 
brought face to face with a problem it had not previously recognized, 
can adopt a solution, test it, try it, and ultimately make it work. The 
accounting profession was not too proud to accept both criticism and 
counsel. On the other hand, it was not so short o f confidence or talent 
that it would swallow any medicine prescribed without considering 
the consequences. In that spirit, the accounting profession experi­
mented with, complained about, gradually realized the importance 
of, became accustomed to, and has finally accepted the Quality Control 
Inquiry Committee.
The evolution o f the Special Investigations Committee into the 
present Quality Control Inquiry Committee is a demonstration o f how 
good men o f strong and divergent views can, by a combination o f 
events, personalities, necessity, and the passage o f time, work out a 
process that serves them and others well. The profession had legitimate 
concerns and fears. These were dealt with in a sensitive fashion and 
largely overcome by persistent and thoughtful effort over a number 
o f years by those involved, the chairmen and members o f the SEC 
Practice Section Executive Committee, AICPA staff, special Institute 
review committees, house counsel for a number o f the larger firms, 
the POB and the SEC.
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Threads Running Through the QCIC's Evolution
Two threads run throughout the history o f the Special Investiga­
tions Committee, and that history is more understandable if one is 
aware of these. The first is a continuing contest between two conflicting 
forces: (1) the necessity o f providing for the public interest which 
demanded that the reason for "audit failures" be immediately identi­
fied and eliminated; (2) the importance to accounting firms o f a vigor­
ous defense against litigation arising out o f alleged audit failures and 
a fear that the actions o f the Special Investigations Committee would 
jeopardize that defense. The attempt to balance these two forces 
continues to this day.
The second thread also involves a contest and is related to the 
first. Critics o f the accounting profession argue that regulation means 
discovery, identification, and punishment o f those who fail to serve 
the public interest. Those responsible for faulty audits must be iden­
tified and punished, and that should be the role o f the Special Inves­
tigations Committee.
The profession's contention has been to the contrary. It holds 
that the legal system is peculiarly qualified and equipped to deal with 
fault and punishment. The most important contribution the Special 
Investigations Committee can make is to investigate plaintiff's alle­
gations to determine if they indicate weakness in the defendant firm's 
system of quality control. If they do, attention should then be turned 
to remedying those weaknesses. The best way to serve the public 
interest is to eliminate weaknesses in quality control so future audits 
will better serve their purpose. Punishment is a matter for the courts 
to deal with.
A third but much less important thread can also be distinguished. 
When the SIC was first proposed, the emphasis was on litigation in 
cases so important that the public became aroused and confidence 
in independent auditing suffered. Thus any cases that received sub­
stantial and continuing media attention should be investigated by the 
Special Investigations Committee. A somewhat different point o f view 
was raised by those more interested in audit quality than in media
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attention. "An audit is an audit is an audit." Any "bad" audit has impli­
cations for quality control. Should not, then, every audit in litigation 
be given sufficient attention to discover whether it reveals a weakness 
in quality control so that any weakness, if one exists, can be eliminated?
From our vantage point, looking back on an extended period o f 
close association with the activities o f the Special Investigations 
Committee, the progress which it has made is closely tied to the in­
terplay o f these forces. Recognizing and following these threads will 
help us to understand the difficulty and the nature o f that progress.
Chapter 2
THE NEED AND THE SOLUTION
The Demand for Regulation
In the latter part o f the 1970s, the accounting profession came 
under Congressional scrutiny and criticism. With the advantage o f 
hindsight, one could readily conclude that this should have been ex­
pected sooner or later. An advanced economic society is heavily de­
pendent on free financial markets and the easy flow of credit for the 
allocation o f its scarce resources. This requires some mechanism for 
evaluating the reliability o f the claims o f past and future success by 
those seeking to obtain additional resources. Audited financial state­
ments provided a widely accepted basis for such evaluations. The 
profession o f public accounting performed the audits largely free o f 
any significant government supervision. Sooner or later, however, 
major cases in which accountants were alleged to be at fault, and the 
public had suffered financial losses, were bound to attract Congres­
sional attention.
When Congressional investigators "discovered" independent au­
diting, found it wanting, and proposed regulation to correct alleged 
deficiencies, the profession was taken by surprise, nevertheless, the 
profession's leadership proved equal to the "emergency." In effect, 
the profession negotiated a suitable response working closely with 
the Securities and Exchange Commission which in turn had to satisfy 
the profession's Congressional critics. From the profession's point o f 
view, a self-regulatory program was clearly preferable to government 
regulation. The story o f that negotiation is undoubtedly a fascinating 
one, and one yet to be fully told. But that is not our purpose here. 
Suffice it to note that government regulation was forestalled; the 
profession's self-regulatory proposal was given a trial period to dem­
onstrate its worth under the scrutiny o f the SEC. If self-regulation served 
the public interest in adequate fashion, it would be accepted. If not, 
Congress would supplement the program as necessary.
The profession's proposal included (1) expansion o f the AICPA to 
include a Division for CPA Firms with two Sections, (2) membership
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rules in each section that held the member firms to rigorous require­
ments including triennial peer reviews o f each firm's quality control 
system and its audit performance in compliance with that system, 
and (3), for the SEC Practice Section, an independent Public Oversight 
Board to assure that the public interest in independent auditing re­
ceived appropriate consideration at all times.
Self-Regulation Through Peer Review
The heart o f this system was to be a triennial peer review. The 
emphasis in peer review was on the specific firm's system o f quality 
control and the firm's compliance with it. There was explicit recogni­
tion that personnel failure was always a possibility. Compliance with 
a satisfactory system o f quality control made audit failure by a con­
scientious and adequately trained auditor unlikely. Yet, no system 
could, at acceptable cost, completely eliminate the potential for human 
error or assure that a wayward partner or staff member might not fail 
to perform in accordance with the requirements o f the quality control 
system.
To assure that the system was effective, a peer review was to 
include examination not only o f the system itself—that is the em­
ployment practices, guidance manuals, other instructions, checklists, 
training programs, reference facilities, and other components o f the 
system—but was also to include review of the application o f that system 
as documented in the workpapers o f recently completed audit en­
gagements. Discussion with the responsible auditors was a regular 
feature o f this review o f workpapers.
At the conclusion o f a peer review, the review team's findings 
were discussed with the reviewed firm's representatives in an exit 
conference. Thereafter, an opinion was to be issued by the peer review 
team, accompanied by a letter o f comment if necessary. The reviewed 
firm was expected to respond to the letter o f comment in writing. A 
copy o f the opinion, letter o f comment, and the firm's letter o f response 
were included in a public file at the AICPA open for inspection by 
anyone interested.
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Traumatic as the idea o f peer review may have been, the profes­
sion went forward with the program. Early on, the Securities and Ex­
change Commission was assigned the responsibility to report annually 
to Congress on its evaluation o f the functioning o f the self-regulatory 
program of the accounting profession. The SEC was provided "access" 
to the functioning o f the peer review program, including review of 
selected peer review and POB workpapers masked as to the identity 
of the specific audit engagements for which audit workpapers were 
reviewed. The SEC staffs review has resulted in acceptance o f the 
quality o f the peer review process and strong endorsement o f the 
peer review program by the SEC in its report to Congress each year.
Litigation —  The Fatal Flaw
Shortly after the self-regulatory program was instituted, Congres­
sional critics perceived what they considered a "fatal flaw" in the pro­
cess. Although peer review might be a satisfactory way o f evaluating a 
firm's system for conducting its accounting and auditing practice, it 
did not deal with specific alleged audit failures. Peer review standards 
permitted the exclusion o f engagements in litigation so that the 
reviewer's findings could not become a matter for discovery by the 
plaintiff. Yet allegations o f audit failure in litigation at least implied 
that the quality control system had not succeeded in its purpose. Unless 
something was done immediately, it might fail again. This was the 
asserted "fatal flaw" in the system as it stood then.
The critics reasoned, what good is a peer review program if audit 
failures continue? What good is a self-regulatory program if those guilty 
o f substandard work are not punished? "One CPA in jail is worth more 
than all the peer reviews ever made" was one critic's comment.
The SIC As a Solution
This led the Public Oversight Board, very early in its existence, to 
urge that a committee be appointed to investigate the quality control 
implications o f such litigation. As Vice-Chairman Garrett had analo­
gized: "Was the crash the result o f 'pilot error' or 'equipment failure'?"
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The question was not * Who was at fault?" so much as " What must be 
done to assure the public that similar errors (if any had occurred) 
would not be repeated in the future?" The Board reasoned that litiga­
tion filed against a member firm suggested the possibility that either 
the firm had a quality control weakness o f some kind that peer review 
had not discovered, or that the profession's guidance was inadequate 
in some respect. And the public interest required that the profession 
take prompt steps to determine if either o f these possibilities was 
true.
Of course, there were other possibilities. The auditors could have 
been misled by collusive action on the part o f the auditee's staff or 
management, action that would have required investigatory work well 
beyond that included in a normal financial audit. Or there might have 
been an audit deficiency that resulted from a personnel failure that 
had nothing to do with the firm's system o f quality control. Yet, because 
the possibility o f system weakness or inadequate guidance could not 
be denied, something more in the way o f investigation was required. 
From the point o f view o f the Public Oversight Board, the public interest 
required the profession to provide for such investigations as part o f 
its self-regulatory program.
To its credit, the Executive Committee o f the SEC Practice Section 
responded affirmatively. The Special Investigations Committee was 
created and appointed, but not without serious misgivings on the part 
o f some accountants at the highest levels in the SEC Practice Section.
The Special Investigations Committee and Litigation 
Risk
The fears o f those members o f the Executive Committee o f the 
SEC Practice Section who opposed formation o f the Special Investiga­
tions Committee were genuine. Litigation against firms had become a 
substantial and increasing burden. The potential loss in class action 
suits was staggering. Many accountants believed that the legal system 
was biased in favor o f plaintiffs, and that damages assessed against 
accounting firms bore little or no relation to their responsibilities for
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investors' losses. The cost o f litigation in time, undesirable publicity, 
and uncertainty was painful to all concerned. With the balance already 
weighted in favor o f the plaintiff, why should a defendant firm be put 
further at a disadvantage by investigation o f its quality controls and 
audit practice by the Special Investigations Committee? And who knew 
how far the committee might go and whether its work might be used 
by plaintiff's bar?
Traditional AICPA Policy Re Cases in Litigation
It may be well to point out here that the AICPA had a well estab­
lished policy o f not investigating cases in litigation. Ethics charges 
against a member might be made in connection with the suit, but the 
Ethics Committee would wait until any litigation had been settled and 
then proceed as seemed appropriate in the circumstances. The reasons 
for this policy were twofold. First, the system o f justice in this country 
provides litigants with rights and rules o f procedure designed to fa­
cilitate full and fair investigation and settlement o f issues and disputes. 
A professional body like the AICPA has few o f the powers o f our judicial 
system to proceed effectively in obtaining all the relevant information 
available without infringing on the rights o f those involved. Second, 
any action against a person by his professional peers, regardless o f 
the ultimate outcome o f that action, conceivably could be used by 
plaintiff's attorneys to a defendant's detriment in either civil or criminal 
proceedings. Thus the establishment o f the Special Investigations 
Committee included at least the suggestion that the AICPA might be 
modifying its traditional policy, a policy most members thought was 
essential to their welfare.
Chapter 3
IMPLEMENTING THE SOLUTION
The Special Investigations Committee's Organizational 
Document
A careful reading o f the Organizational Document will reveal:
1. Considerable care to assure that member firms would not be 
sanctioned without due process and ample opportunity for de­
fense.
2. Strong emphasis on the importance o f confidentiality for all Spe­
cial Investigations Committee activity. Concern was expressed 
that the work o f the committee might become known to plaintiff 
bar and be used against member firms engaged in litigation.
3. A need to balance the public interest with the prejudice to a firm, 
or individuals within the firm, that could occur if the SIC were to 
commence and continue an investigation while the firm or indi­
viduals in it were involved in litigation.
The Organizational Document provided for a nine-member com­
mittee o f experienced auditors, each eligible for two staggered three- 
year terms. The purpose o f the committee was threefold, to:
1. Identify corrective measures, if any, that should be taken by a 
member firm involved in a specific alleged audit failure.
2. Determine whether facts related to specific alleged audit failures 
indicated that changes in generally accepted auditing standards 
or qualify control standards needed to be considered. 3
3. Recommend to the Executive Committee, when deemed neces­
sary, appropriate sanctions with respect to member firms.
Member firms were required to report to the committee, within 
30 days o f service on them o f first pleading, any litigation against 
them or their personnel, or any proceeding or investigation publicly 
announced by a regulatory agency, commenced on or after November 
1, 1979, if that litigation alleges deficiencies in the conduct o f an
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audit or reporting thereon in connection with any required filing un­
der the Federal securities laws. The initial notification was to be ac­
companied by a copy o f the complaint or indictment or other charges 
filed.
Instructions to the Special Investigations Committee
On receipt o f such information, the committee was obliged to 
"screen," that is review, the information and to determine what the 
committee's further procedures would be. These procedures were 
identified in the Organizational Document as "(1) to 'monitor' devel­
opments in the case without investigation o f the firm or the case, 
pending the conclusion o f litigation or other proceeding or investiga­
tion; (2) to 'investigate the firm' without investigating the case; (3) to 
recommend 'investigation o f the case' to the Executive Committee; 
and/or (4) to close its files on the case."
Monitoring was a holding action in anticipation o f developments 
or disclosures that would provide the committee with additional infor­
mation that would help it choose among its other options. Investiga­
tion o f a firm was to be initiated if the complaint or other information 
implied strongly that the public interest required;
1. A review of certain o f the firm's quality control policies and pro­
cedures, and/or a review of compliance with those policies and 
procedures by certain offices or individuals.
2. A review o f other engagements performed by the firm's office(s) 
or personnel involved in the case or o f other engagements in the 
same industry. 3
3. Interviews o f the firm's personnel with functional responsibility 
for a specialized industry if the case involved such an industry.
Obviously, investigation o f a firm was not something desired by 
any member firm. The implications o f such an investigation were that 
either the firm or some of its personnel may have fallen short o f pro­
fessional standards. No member o f the Section looked forward to the 
possibility o f being the first firm so investigated.
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The Ultimate Action —  Investigation of a Case
Investigation o f a case was the most severe treatment that a firm 
could receive, short o f a sanction. The clear implication o f such an 
investigation was that a serious failure in complying with quality con­
trol standards was suspected, that someone was at fault, and that 
despite the AICPA's traditional policy regarding litigation, immediate 
action was necessary for the protection o f the public and the good o f 
the profession. The decision for so extreme an action was not to be 
trusted to the Special Investigations Committee by itself. If the com­
mittee thought that a case should be investigated, it would recom­
mend such action to the Executive Committee, and could do nothing 
more without express authorization from the Executive Committee.
And before making such a recommendation to the Executive 
Committee, the SIC "shall advise the firm of its intention to make 
such a recommendation and shall give the firm (through counsel or 
otherwise) an opportunity to present its views in writing as to whether 
such recommendation is appropriate in the circumstances. If the rec­
ommendation is made to the Executive Committee, the firm shall be 
given an opportunity to express its views in writing to the Executive 
Committee."
Precisely what would be included in an investigation o f a case 
was never specified. The general belief seemed to be that the com­
mittee would set out to find what went wrong and who was responsible. 
The fact that such an investigation would be undertaken only "in the 
most egregious cases," implied rather strongly that the firm or indi­
viduals responsible would have a difficult time in establishing their 
innocence or the propriety o f their actions.
To say that some members o f the SEC Practice Section thought 
the Section had gone too far in giving such powers to its new Special 
Investigations Committee is an understatement. Considerable concern 
was soon expressed that the committee had far too much authority 
and might well increase the already substantial risks o f litigation in 
ways detrimental to the entire profession.
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Efforts to Provide Additional Guidance to the SIC
An early response to the fears expressed by some members o f 
the Section was an attempt to devise and establish operational pro­
cedures to specify more clearly than did the Organizational Document 
the process to be followed by the new Special Investigations Com­
mittee. In attempting to work out a set o f operational guides for the 
Special Investigations Committee, the AICPA staff found the leadership 
o f the SEC Practice Section so opposed to any procedure that might 
increase litigation risk as to make the task a most difficult one. How­
ever, hours and days o f thoughtful work in drafting proposed rules 
and negotiating terminology differences ultimately resulted in the 
"Decision Tree and Criteria for Acting on Reported Cases," which was 
adopted by the Special Investigations Committee in March 1981. From 
the outset, the approach called for in these guidelines provoked pro­
found concerns among Executive Committee members who feared 
that the SIC might implement them in ways that would unwittingly 
escalate the litigation risk to member firms.
Criteria like "significant reasonable public demand for prompt 
discipline o f the firm for alleged gross violation o f generally accepted 
auditing standards" calling for investigation o f a case, and "high public 
interest or reasonable possibility o f future audit failures" as justifica­
tion for investigation o f a firm posed risks they considered too great 
to be accepted.
Looking back on that crucial period in SIC history, one can have 
some sympathy for the fears expressed by the members o f that Ex­
ecutive Committee. The "decision tree" was intended to be a working 
tool to be applied with judgment by SIC members. But the members 
o f the Executive Committee—which included several o f the firms 
serving the predominant majority o f public companies and therefore 
having much o f the litigation the SIC would have to consider—had 
had no experience dealing with these SIC members who were about 
to apply the procedures o f the decision tree to their cases. Rigid ap­
plication could be disastrous, consequently, a joint task force o f Ex­
ecutive Committee and SIC members set out to prune the "decision 
tree."
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That effort led to the scrapping o f the "decision tree" in favor o f a 
document developed by the joint task force which was titled "Guide­
lines and Considerations Relevant to Actions on Reported Litigation." 
The guidelines in this document were intended to be less rigid. How­
ever, certain Executive Committee members still found aspects o f 
the guidelines objectionable. They were adopted by default by the 
SIC in February 1983, because the SIC had to get on with its business. 
In any event, a blue ribbon committee had only recently been formed 
to study the objectives and activities o f the Section, including the 
SIC.
According to the guidelines, SIC members carefully had to weigh 
the public interest in a case and the possible prejudice that SIC activity 
concerning a case could cause to a member firm's defense in litigation. 
SIC members were provided with a list o f factors relevant to their 
assessment o f public interest. In addition, the guidelines provided for 
possible inquiries o f member firms. Except for inquiries specifically 
related to the alleged audit failure, firms were expected to provide 
information in response. The guidelines included the caveat that a 
decision to investigate a firm could result in significant prejudice to 
pending litigation or other proceedings o f a firm. Accordingly, a feature 
was added to the process to protect the interest o f firms, namely— 
before the SIC would vote on whether an investigation o f a firm should 
be ordered, henceforth, a member firm would be given the opportu­
nity to appear before the committee to hear the reasons for such a 
motion and to present its views.
Early Difficulties Facing the Committee
Establishing the Special Investigations Committee and appointing 
its first members did not assure its success. Few committees in the 
history o f the AICPA faced as much opposition or carried such heavy 
burdens.
The requirement o f absolute confidentiality, intended to protect 
members o f the profession in litigation, stood like a wall between the 
committee members and their professional colleagues. Very few people
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in the profession had any idea what the committee did, how it oper­
ated, or what influenced its decisions. Although the committee was 
composed o f reasonable men who went about their difficult task 
sensibly and responsibly, the committee was forbidden to make this 
information known. Only committee members, the POB, and a few 
AICPA staff members knew that the "decision tree," and later "the 
guidelines," existed. Almost unavoidably, therefore, the knowledge 
that such a committee had been appointed but operated in secret 
resulted in greater concern about its activities than was justified.
The strong feeling that the committee should not investigate spe­
cific cases except in the most unusual circumstances and then only 
with permission o f the Executive Committee o f the Section, together 
with the concern that the committee would exceed its authority, meant 
that any questions by committee members during screening or moni­
toring that were related in any way to a reported case were met with a 
cold rebuff: "Mow you are investigating the case."
At the same time, critics of the profession and its self-regulatory 
apparatus were eager to have a case investigated. In effect, they chal­
lenged the profession to prove that it would identify and fix responsi­
bility for audit deficiencies. To many o f them, regulation meant finding 
and punishing the guilty. Until the SIC did exactly that, its credibility 
would not be established. Indeed, the entire self-regulatory program 
remained under a cloud.
Even some friends o f the profession had doubts that it would 
ever go so far as to permit investigation o f a case. Some o f them 
asserted that including the possibility o f investigation o f a case in the 
Organizational Document was a mistake. They firmly believed that 
the established policy o f the AICPA would withstand modification, and 
that the kind o f investigation necessary to establish responsibility in 
specific sets o f circumstances should be left to the judicial system. 
Thus, including provision for investigation o f a case was unrealistic 
and would lead to expectations that could never be fulfilled.
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Early Work by the Special Investigations Committee
Yet even during this period o f unsuccessful negotiation, concern, 
and seeming frustration, progress in establishing the SIC as an impor­
tant factor in the self-regulatory program was made. The members o f 
the committee were in place, litigation was reported, task forces were 
appointed and assigned to instances o f litigation reported to the Sec­
tion. The committee members read the allegations, discussed them 
with other members o f the committee, inquired o f the firms involved, 
closed some cases, monitored others, and gradually developed working 
procedures.
When one line o f questioning failed, another was tried. Some 
firm representatives were much more forthcoming than others; some 
committee members were more skilled and more persistent in their 
pursuit o f information than others. Strengthening one another in their 
committee meetings through reports o f inquiries during the screen­
ing process; refusing to close cases when responses to inquiries were 
unsatisfactory; the first members o f the committee deserve great credit 
for developing procedures and standards, however informal, that have 
served the committee and the profession well. By going about their 
work with diligence and persistence, yet with an awareness o f the 
sensitivity o f the matters they dealt with, the early members o f the 
committee slowly began to overcome some o f the fears o f those in­
volved in the cases reported to the committee.
Chapter 4
TESTING THE SOLUTION
The Credibility Issue
One o f the purposes in establishing the SEC Practice Section was 
to convince Congress that governmental regulation o f public ac­
counting was unnecessary, that the profession was both responsive 
and responsible, and was better able to police its members' activities 
than anyone else. To persuade Congress that such was the case, the 
profession needed the support o f the SEC. The SEC staff was able to 
satisfy itself through review o f selected peer review workpapers that 
the peer review program was working satisfactorily. The confidential­
ity requirements imposed upon the SIC made any such arrangement 
with respect to SIC activities much more difficult to establish. Liaison 
efforts between the SEC staff and POB representatives continued for 
some time in the hope that some form o f "access" to SIC activities 
could be worked out. The confidentiality requirement for the 
committee's activities frustrated every effort.
SEC staff members took the position that they could not "approve" 
the work o f the SIC unless they knew what that work consisted of. 
Could the SEC staff send a representative to SIC meetings as an ob­
server? The answer had to be negative. Would the SEC staff be willing 
to rely on oral or written assurances from members o f the POB that 
the SIC was performing its task satisfactorily? Again, the answer had 
to be negative. The SEC staff could not approve the performance o f 
the Special Investigations Committee without direct information as to 
the nature o f the allegations against a firm and how the committee 
satisfied itself that anything about those allegations having any rel­
evance to the reliance the public placed on audited financial state­
ments had been dealt with satisfactorily.
The litigation-related fears o f the member firms that led directly 
to strict confidentiality, and the need o f the SEC staff for "access" 
sufficient to provide direct information, resulted in an impasse. Con­
siderable time was to be spent in exploring such possibilities as oral 
briefings by POB members and staff to SEC staff members, review of
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POB workpapers, and the development o f closed case summaries. 
The difficulties each party to the difference has had in conceding 
enough to satisfy the other have seemed insurmountable. However, 
as o f the date o f this writing, while the SEC has yet formally to ex­
press satisfaction with the work o f the SIC, there is reason to be op­
timistic that the Commission will soon recognize the role o f the SIC in 
the self-regulatory program.
The First "Investigation of a Firm" —  Three o f Them!
But the ultimate question remained: What will happen if and when 
the committee finds an investigation beyond screening and monitor­
ing necessary? Unavoidably, that question was finally faced, and the 
circumstances could hardly have been more difficult for the commit­
tee.
A single auditee had been the client o f three major firms in suc­
cession. The client failed. A regulatory agency in the client's industry 
had made information available while the SIC had the case "in moni­
toring" that convinced the committee investigations o f the firms were 
required. Thus the committee had not one but three investigations in 
mind. But there was a catch, one o f the firms contended that litigation 
involving it had been commenced before the November 1, 1979 cut­
off date. Hence, on technical grounds, that firm raised an objection 
to being investigated. It contended that the Special Investigations 
Committee lacked jurisdiction because the date o f the first litigation 
in the case preceded the November 1, 1979 date on which the SIC's 
authority commenced. The technical questions o f whether the other 
firms could then claim the same exemption and whether the first firm's 
claim was valid had never been faced before.
The Special Investigations Committee reconsidered its reasons 
for recommending the investigations and decided to proceed. Legal 
representatives o f the AICPA and the three firms involved met to dis­
cuss the legalities at issue. No resolution o f the disagreement emerged. 
The committee decided to take its case to the Executive Committee
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and requested permission to investigate the firm that claimed juris­
dictional protection at the same time it investigated the other two 
firms.
Under the terms o f the Organizational Document the Special In­
vestigations Committee had the right to initiate an investigation o f a 
firm on its own authority. But to get the November 1, 1979 cutoff 
date waived so it could treat the three firms alike, the committee had 
to come to the Executive Committee for its permission
The session with the Executive Committee was not a pleasant 
one for the representatives o f the Special Investigations Committee. 
Restricted by the requirement o f confidentiality for the committee's 
work, they were unable to present a complete explanation. Unavoid­
ably, the fact that the committee proposed to investigate three firms, 
each a national firm, surfaced during this discussion. Some members 
o f the Executive Committee seized upon this as evidence that the 
committee, in its zeal, had gone much too far and now constituted a 
threat to the profession. The Executive Committee decided to wait 
until its next meeting to resolve the issue, thereby giving all involved 
time to cool down and think the problem through.
POB Support and Professional Criticism
During this waiting period, the chairman and other members o f 
the Special Investigations Committee met with the POB to present 
their case. The POB also met with the Planning Committee o f the Ex­
ecutive Committee and stated its support for the Special Investiga­
tions Committee. The Planning Committee o f the Executive Commit­
tee at this point was persuaded to approve the SIC's request. The 
firm that relied on the cutoff date for its defense then agreed to waive 
that defense and to accept an investigation o f the firm along with the 
other two firms.
The investigations then went forward. They served the purposes 
of the committee, but left some Executive Committee members much 
disturbed. Some time later, one o f them wrote a widely circulated 
seven-page letter to an AICPA staff member denouncing the establish­
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ment o f the Special Investigations Committee. Among his comments 
were the following:
From having participated in most of the meetings that led up to 
the formation of the SIC, I know that the drafters would have pre­
ferred not to provide for investigations of a case, or even of a 
firm, while litigation is in process. They yielded on this point be­
cause of pressure from the Public Oversight Board and the SEC, 
but I know that they did not expect many investigations under 
those circumstances. This expectation is proving to be completely 
unrealistic... Specifically, it sounds as if the investigation of the 
firm is far enough removed from the specifics of a particular case 
to make it substantially less risky. As a practical matter, however, 
the fact that the investigation has been initiated as a result of a 
case is in itself prejudicial.
The concern about the undesirable effect that an "investigation o f a 
firm" might have on the ultimate outcome o f litigation expressed in 
the letter was shared by many others in the profession and consti­
tuted the environment in which the first investigations were conducted.
Nature of the First Investigations
The investigations included reviews o f the manuals, checklists, 
and other practice aids the firms used in the conduct o f audits in the 
industry o f the alleged audit failure. In addition, the workpapers for a 
sample o f engagements in that industry were reviewed in various 
practice offices including work performed by the office and the en­
gagement team responsible for the alleged audit failure for each firm.
The firms that had performed the previous peer review o f each 
firm under investigation were requested by the SIC to conduct the 
investigations under supervision by SIC representatives. Those mak­
ing the investigations were careful to avoid any action that might be 
construed as investigation o f or inquiry into the specific case in liti­
gation.
Through these investigations, the Special Investigations Commit­
tee satisfied itself that the three firms had fundamentally sound ap­
proaches to conducting audits in the industry in question, and were
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applying those approaches in an appropriate manner. One o f the firms 
was found to have inadequate documentation in its workpapers o f 
important audit conclusions on one client. Nevertheless, the investi­
gators were satisfied with that firm's conclusions and the bases on 
which they were founded.
Lessons Learned from These Investigations
If we try to summarize the lessons learned through these first 
three investigations o f firms, we might make statements like the fol­
lowing:
1. Performance o f the review did not subject the firms to any ob­
servable litigation risk not already present.
2. Investigations performed by the firms' peer reviewers under the 
supervision o f representatives o f the SIC were completely satis­
factory to the SIC representatives in charge o f the investigations.
3. Useful investigations could be performed without intrusion into 
the case in litigation that caused the investigation. Yet information 
about the case in litigation, obtained from whatever source, could 
be crucial in determining whether additional investigation is 
needed.
4. A special investigation could uncover matters o f sufficient impor­
tance to require the firm in question to take remedial action.
Another lesson o f quite a different kind came out o f the 
committee's experience with these first investigations. The committee 
had been following the three reported cases since February 1980 and 
had discussed issues related to them with the reporting firms. However, 
it was not until November 1981, when the SIC obtained a copy o f a 
report prepared by a Special Examiner appointed by the U.S. Bank­
ruptcy Court, that the SIC finally obtained information sufficient to 
identify the relevant quality control issues involved and to determine 
that investigations o f the firms were called for. One wonders if these 
investigations would have occurred if there had not been an examiner's 
report available to the SIC.
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These three cases raised anew the question o f whether the SIC 
could properly perform its function without some discussion with firms 
reporting cases. These investigations were launched long after the 
litigation had been reported, and only after details o f what might have 
gone wrong were made public as a result o f investigations performed 
for a trustee in bankruptcy. If any o f the three firms had had serious 
quality control deficiencies related to its work in the relevant indus­
try, a considerable period o f time would have elapsed before any 
action resulted from the SIC's involvement.
The SIC could not always count on other interested bodies to 
provide key information. Neither could it wait until such information 
became publicly available. As a minimum, the SIC representatives 
needed to discuss the allegations in reported cases with firm repre­
sentatives to be in a position to determine whether significant quality 
control issues were present. Following the completion o f these in­
vestigations, members o f the SIC task forces were much less reluctant 
to direct questions to firm representatives about the specific allega­
tions in reported cases.
Equally important, as time passed, firm representatives became 
perceptibly less defensive in their responses to such questions. By 
June 30, 1984, member firms had reported almost 100 cases to the 
SIC. Firms were gradually losing their fear o f this new committee that 
could intrude on what had heretofore been the firm's most private 
business. Also, the conduct o f the SIC representatives had been found 
not to add significantly to any firm's litigation risk. We have yet to 
learn o f any instance in which conduct o f an investigation by the Special 
Investigations Committee has had any direct or indirect bearing on 
the outcome o f litigation against a firm or individuals.
Chapter 5
STRENGTHENING THE SOLUTION
The Chetkovich Committee
At about this time, the Special Investigations Committee received 
crucial support from a Special Review Committee formed by the 
AICPA's Board o f Directors in 1983 to study the structure, operation, 
and effectiveness o f the SEC Practice Section's self-regulatory program. 
After a thorough study o f the work o f the Section's committees, the 
Special Review Committee, informally referred to by the name o f its 
chairman, Michael N. Chetkovich, made the following recommenda­
tions, among others:
1. That the Special Investigations Committee be continued with 
much the same responsibilities.
2. That the possibility o f an investigation o f a case be struck from 
the SIC Organizational Document. 3
3. That the SIC be enabled to obtain information directly from re­
porting firms in order to discharge its responsibilities promptly.
In effect, each o f these recommendations recognized what already 
existed in fact. The Special Investigations Committee had proved its 
worth, and although the Securities and Exchange Commission had 
not yet given the committee any formal approval, any attempt to dis­
continue the SIC and its work would have met with great resistance. 
Also, the nature o f the Special Investigations Committee's work, al­
ways directed toward remedial measures leaving punishment to the 
courts, meant that an investigation o f a case was very unlikely ever to 
take place.
Finally, some o f the more aggressive members o f the SIC had 
already begun to direct questions to member firms about specific 
cases in litigation. Such questions were not an attempt to find fault or 
to fix blame; they were a relatively economical way to get at possible 
quality control weaknesses. "How did the firm respond to the allega­
tions? Was the office involved included in the last peer review? What
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were the findings? Were the members o f the audit team covered in 
the last inspection program? How did they come out in the evalua­
tions? How had the firm evaluated the client as an audit risk? Were 
any special steps taken in selection o f the audit team? Did the client's 
industry present any special problems? What measures were taken to 
assure that the audit team received any special help needed to deal 
with industry problems?"
Almost unavoidably, these kinds o f questions were finding their 
way into the operating procedures o f the committee. And as firm rep­
resentatives became persuaded that committee members were not 
interested in judging the adequacy o f the audit through the informa­
tion received in such exchanges, they became less concerned about 
the possibility that the committee was obtaining information that might 
ultimately be used against the firm in litigation. Indeed, the coopera­
tion o f some firms in the work o f the committee clearly indicated that 
those firms were as anxious to discover and correct any weaknesses 
in their quality control systems as was the committee.
So the recommendations o f the Chetkovich Committee were far 
from revolutionary. Nonetheless, they were extremely important. An 
objective review o f the activities o f the Section by an independent 
and high quality committee did much to strengthen the acceptance 
and position o f the Special Investigations Committee. Criticisms by 
representatives o f member firms now had to be supported by some­
thing more than vague assertions that the committee was a threat 
and a menace.
The "Second Round" of Investigations
Just about the time the committee was launching its first round 
o f investigations, and doing so in the face o f considerable criticism, 
two additional cases were reported that were unrelated except that 
both involved the same member firm. In both cases, the client com­
panies and their managements would be severely censured for 
"cooking the books' to mask financial difficulties. These cases raised 
the question: Where were the auditors? Less than two months from
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the date o f the regulatory complaint against the company and its 
management in the first o f these two cases, the Special Investigations 
Committee decided that the public interest required an investigation 
o f the firm. It did so even though the CFA firm was not named in the 
complaint.
Having fought its way through the opposition to its first investiga­
tions, the committee was prepared for whatever might be necessary 
to investigate the firm in question in the current cases. But the situation 
turned out to be substantially different. The firm representative was 
very open and forthcoming. The cases received heavy media attention. 
The committee would likely have been criticized both within and 
without the profession if it had not moved quickly to commence ap­
propriate investigations.
The first three investigations were conducted by member firms, 
in each case the firm responsible for the last peer review o f the firm 
under investigation. For the next investigation, the SIC selected a team 
of reviewers under the direct supervision o f a practitioner whose 
reputation for personal integrity and whose other professional cre­
dentials were well known. The committee maintained overall supervi­
sion and review responsibility through two o f its members. The team 
selected and reviewed 13 audit engagements o f publicly-held clients 
in the four offices that participated in the two allegedly substandard 
audits, including work supervised by the partners and managers re­
sponsible for the audits under question.
The review uncovered serious quality control deficiencies in one 
o f the four offices and the need for extensive corrective action. This 
included but was not limited to (a) appointing a new partner in charge 
o f one office, (b) requiring in-depth concurring partner review on future 
engagements by qualified partners from outside the office, and (c) 
both reassigning and terminating audit personnel, including partners. 
The SIC required the firm to develop a comprehensive remedial ac­
tion plan, evaluated its comprehensiveness and adequacy and, finally, 
monitored its implementation.
The member firm in question was ultimately named in a regulatory 
action, which required the firm to undergo another review o f its audit
30 Evolution o f the Quality Control Inquiry Committee
practice. This did not occur until after the SIC had conducted the 
extensive investigation.
Strict confidentiality was maintained by the committee over the 
conduct and results o f the investigations o f the four offices. Neither 
the public nor the SEC staff was aware o f them. The fact that the 
investigations had resulted in prompt correction o f quality control de­
ficiencies was clearly in the public interest. These investigations were 
undertaken and completed while litigation was in progress and with­
out any apparent harm to the firm's litigation status. This action showed 
responsiveness to Congressional criticism, namely, that the self-regu­
latory program should not wait until litigation was settled before deal­
ing with alleged audit failures. Additionally, it demonstrated that liti­
gation damage did not necessarily result from doing so.
The Executive Committee o f the SEC Practice Section could have 
authorized public disclosure o f information concerning the investiga­
tion o f the firm for those two cases but decided against it. Consider­
able sentiment to the contrary existed at the time because o f the 
public criticism o f the profession that the two cases had attracted. 
The Executive Committee was still sensitive to fears about damage to 
a firm's defenses in litigation. It argued further that other firms faced 
with a similar set o f circumstances might be less cooperative in 
agreeing to corrective action if they felt such actions would be made 
public.
The POB's 1982-83 annual report was factual and brief on these 
matters:
To date, the committee (Special Investigations) has conducted in­
vestigations of select aspects of the quality control systems of 
four member firms...These investigative teams generally exam­
ined other engagements supervised by personnel involved in the 
alleged failure and engagements in similar industries and with 
similar accounting and auditing issues to those involved in the 
reported litigation...Three of the four investigations resulted in 
recommendations for improvement in the firm's quality control 
system or compliance therewith, all of which were voluntarily 
implemented by each of the firms...the committee is keeping its 
file open on the fourth investigation pending the receipt of the 
findings of an ongoing review to determine whether the suggested 
improvements have in fact been implemented.
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Other Progress by the Quality Control Inquiry Committee
Much o f the committee's accomplishments through June 3 0 , 1984 
was related to the four investigations described, yet the committee 
grew in stature and effectiveness for several other reasons. Its accu­
mulating record o f dealing with each reported case in a professional 
manner, not hesitating to close cases when it found no public interest 
aspects to be pursued, helped member firms to develop confidence 
in its objectivity. Without any significant jurisdictional conflict, the 
committee added three important cases to its agenda, notwithstand­
ing the fact that not one o f the three was required to be reported 
under the SEC Practice Section requirements.
Each o f the cases involved an alleged failure in the audit o f a 
financial institution. The evident importance o f such cases to the 
profession's reputation and the public's interest in them convinced 
the committee members that they required attention. These cases 
established a precedent for including similar cases in the future.
Dialogue with the Auditing Standards Board
In combination with other cases o f alleged failure to properly 
audit the financial statements o f banks, two o f the cases caused the 
committee to question the adequacy o f available professional guidance 
for the conduct o f such audits. As a result, the Public Oversight Board 
on September 2, 1983 wrote the committee expressing its support 
for a reconsideration o f the adequacy o f current professional guidance. 
The letter noted the recent spate o f bank failures and suggested that 
these were likely to undermine the public's confidence in the 
profession's ability to audit banks satisfactorily. It encouraged the 
committee to open a dialogue with the AICPA's Auditing Standards 
Board.
As a consequence, the committee initiated such a dialogue with 
the Auditing Standards Board and with the Institute's Banking Com­
mittee. This proved to be the first o f a series o f dialogues with the 
Auditing Standards Board; these now occur as necessary but no less 
frequently than annually.
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The exchange with the Banking Committee resulted in valuable 
additional guidance to auditors o f banks. Published in The CPA Let­
ter, this guidance alerted practitioners to some important aspects o f 
bank auditing. For example, practitioners were urged to consider 
carefully the possible implications o f insider loans, loan participations 
purchased and sold, and undue loan concentrations in evaluating the 
adequacy o f the allowance for loan losses.
Other Results of the Financial Institutions' Audit Cases
In addition to recommending attention to guidance for bank au­
diting, the committee's work with the three cases focused attention 
on questions about the effectiveness o f quality controls and compli­
ance therewith in the three firms that audited the financial institutions. 
Each firm gave its total cooperation.
One o f the cases clearly exemplified the mutuality o f interest 
between private regulation (actions taken within firms) and the self- 
regulatory program (peer review and the special investigations pro­
cess). While the Special Investigations Committee had previously 
caught glimpses o f the actions taken by firms to study and strengthen 
quality controls when litigation raised a question about them, this 
case provided dramatic evidence o f such action. The firm literally 
investigated itself.
An extensive review o f its banking practice was performed in­
cluding an evaluation o f controls and a testing o f compliance with 
firm policy. Top people from other offices were brought in to provide 
an objective and thoroughly professional review. The SIC was made 
privy to the nature and scope o f the review while it was in process. 
On completion o f the review, the committee was given access to all 
the findings, made its own evaluation, and helped to shape the cor­
rective action plan implemented by the firm. The experience gained 
in this case provided a model for QCIC action in a number o f subse­
quent high profile cases.
In the second o f the three cases, the committee, in a meeting 
with representatives o f the firm and its peer reviewing firm, ascer­
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tained that the engagement partner had not recently supervised au­
dits. The committee satisfied itself through inquiry concerning the 
adequacy o f the firm's quality controls for audit work similar to the 
audit in litigation. The committee insisted that the office responsible 
for the alleged audit failure be included in the firm's imminent peer 
review, and that the peer review team test relevant quality controls.
The third case had earlier received attention from the committee 
including extensive discussion o f the allegations o f fault with repre­
sentatives o f the firm and review o f a regulatory report which did not 
pinpoint any weakness in the firm's quality controls or its audit ap­
proach. The committee had then closed the case.
Prompted by sharper and more specific criticism of the firm's 
audit in a new complaint based on additional investigation by a differ­
ent regulator, the case was reopened by the committee fourteen 
months later. The committee's work convinced it that an investigation 
o f the office responsible for the audit was desirable. The investigation 
required by the SIC was performed by firm personnel from outside 
the office and was subjected to review and testing by the firm's regular 
peer reviewing firm and by a two-member task force o f the commit­
tee. The office was found to be practicing at an acceptable level o f 
quality.
As a result o f its work on this case, the committee asked the 
AICPA's Professional Ethics Division to review a specific aspect o f the 
profession's independence rules. The Ethics Division review resulted 
in the issuance o f a clarifying interpretation.
Confidentiality and SEC "Acceptance" of the Special 
Investigations Process
When the Chetkovich Committee reviewed the special investiga­
tions process in 1983, it focused on the fact that the SIC's activities, 
on advice o f legal counsel, were to be conducted under the constraint 
o f complete confidentiality. Counsel had urged total confidentiality to 
avoid possible prejudice o f the defenses o f member firms in litiga­
tion. As noted earlier, member firms were very sensitive to the danger 
any breach o f that confidentiality might impose on them.
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Almost no detail about the activities o f the committee and espe­
cially no information about specific cases had ever been released. As 
a result regulatory  bodies, the Congress, and the public had little 
basis for evaluating the effectiveness o f the committee and its activi­
ties. The hope o f those establishing the committee in response to the 
Public Oversight Board's recommendation was that the stature o f the 
Board, which did have unlimited access to SIC activity and said so in 
its annual report, would be sufficient to give the SIC necessary cred­
ibility. This was not to be. The SEC insisted it could not give its ap­
proval to the work o f the Special Investigations Committee based solely 
on second-hand information, no matter how reputable those provid­
ing it.
SEC Commissioner Barbara S. Thomas was publicly critical o f 
the protective confidentially surrounding the SIC. In a January 1 2 , 1983 
address before the AICPA's National Conference on Current SEC De­
velopments, she chided the SEC Practice Section leadership.
...it is well for the Section not only to take decisive action, but 
also to assure the public that it has done so. Actions that are 
shrouded in secrecy can only reinforce an attitude that the 
profession's own interest is being placed before that of the pub­
lic.
It was now clear that something more extensive and timely in the 
way o f information about SIC cases than appeared in the annual re­
ports o f the POB was necessary if the Special Investigations Commit­
tee were to be perceived as fulfilling its purpose. At the request o f the 
SEC Practice Section Executive Committee, one o f the members o f 
the POB undertook to work with the Chief Accountant o f the SEC in 
an effort to devise a plan that would provide the SEC with the infor­
mation it felt necessary for evaluating work o f the Special Investiga­
tions Committee without unduly jeopardizing the litigation defenses 
o f member firms.
After a number o f proposals failed to gain SEC support, the POB 
proposed that its staff would prepare and submit to the SEC a quar­
terly statistical report o f SIC activity that would include every case 
reported to the SIC from initial reference until the case was closed.
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This report was to be supplemented by two summaries, neither o f 
which would identify any case by name:
• Closed case summary, prepared by the POB, which would anony­
mously report the reasons for closing each case
• Investigations summary, prepared by the SIC, to briefly and 
anonymously describe the focus and scope o f the investigation, 
the composition o f the investigating team, and the committee's 
conclusions.
In addition, the POB undertook to report any differences o f judg­
ment that might eventuate between its staff members and the SIC. 
The reasoning underlying this proposal was that a continuing series 
o f reports on SIC activity would persuade the Commission that the 
SIC played an important and effective role in the Section's self-regu­
latory activities. In April 1983, the Chief Accountant told the POB 
representative that the information to be provided under the proposal 
was not sufficient to enable the SEC staff to evaluate the effectiveness 
o f the SIC. What the SEC staff needed was "access" to SIC activity 
similar to its access to peer review workpapers.
Reducing the Confidentiality Requirement
Among other matters, the Chetkovich Committee addressed the 
question o f whether the confidentiality surrounding SIC activities 
should be relaxed to provide the SEC staff direct access and to permit 
public disclosure o f the remedial and corrective measures resulting 
from those activities. In contemplating the answer to this question. 
Chairman Chetkovich and his colleagues pondered the significance 
o f the following advice from AICPA counsel:
...it would appear highly unlikely that corrective actions under­
taken by a member firm on its own initiative, or as a result of SIC 
procedure and recommendations, would be admissible as evi­
dence in Federal court litigation to prove negligence or culpability.
Their conclusion was that some information about the special 
investigative process should be made public to enhance its credibil­
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ity. However, confidentiality should continue with respect to actions 
taken on specific cases because o f the "...possibility o f substantial 
and often unwarranted prejudice against member firms." Thus the 
Chetkovich Committee recommended that the Section should:
• Provide periodic public reports on the SIC's activities that would 
include aggregated data and statistics on its cases and informa­
tion on remedial and corrective actions taken by member firms 
in connection with those cases.
• Make available in a manner appropriate for educational purposes 
information about unusual or recurring problems encountered 
in the SIC process.
The Section implemented these recommendations when it pub­
licly issued the first report o f the SIC in 1985 covering its activities 
from inception through December 31, 1984.
The commencement o f public reporting on SIC actions and the 
results thereof was an important but measured first step to improve 
the SIC's credibility. Such reporting would not be sufficient to gain 
SEC endorsement.
Investigations o f Firms as "Special Reviews"
The Chetkovich Committee also made another very significant 
suggestion to enhance the credibility o f the SIC. It noted that the 
committee's Organizational Document provided for two types o f in­
vestigation, the "investigation o f a firm" and the "investigation o f a 
case." As explained previously, the Chetkovich Committee had ob­
served that the Special Investigations Committee, by natural constraint, 
could investigate a firm but not a case. Thus it concluded that provi­
sion for investigation o f a case when the SIC would never undertake 
to perform one was unrealistic; therefore, the presence o f such a 
provision was an impediment to the SIC's credibility.
The term "investigation o f a firm" was replaced by "special review" 
without any intent to make the contemplated procedures any less 
comprehensive. The revised Organizational Document calls for a
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"special review" whenever the committee reaches one o f the follow­
ing conclusions:
• There is a reasonable likelihood that the firm might need to take 
specific corrective actions beyond what the firm may have already 
undertaken, and a special review is deemed necessary to deter­
mine the nature and extent o f such actions.
• There is a reasonable need to obtain timely assurance about 
compliance by the firm, or a segment (office or function) thereof, 
or by certain o f its personnel, with one or more o f the firm's 
quality control policies and procedures.
Thus, subsequent to September 1984, an "investigation o f the 
firm" became a "special review." Whatever the label, the contemplated 
procedures were intended to be equally protective o f the public interest 
in the reliability and credibility o f audited financial statements. The 
term "investigation" was considered to have undesirable implications. 
The new designation, "special review," was considered to be more 
descriptive o f the supplementary role the special investigations process 
had vis-a-vis the peer review process in the total self-regulatory pro­
gram.
As AICPA Vice President Kelley observed in early 1984 in connec­
tion with the Chetkovich Committee's work:
It is essential to take reasonable steps to enhance the credibility 
of the SIC because the SIC is essential to the credibility of the 
peer review process. Criticism of the peer review process revolves 
around the continued existence of alleged "audit failures" and the 
fact that peer review is not specifically designed to deal with the 
"people problems" that are likely to be at the root of real audit 
failures.
The change from "investigation o f a firm" to "special review" rep­
resented a logical evolution at the time it was effected. The deemphasis 
o f "investigation" and the use o f "review" related the intended study 
to the peer reviews it supplemented. The review was "special" only in 
the sense that peer reviews took place on a regular triennial basis, 
while "special" reviews differed from peer reviews not in nature or
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substance but in that they occurred on an "as needed" basis and had 
a scope solely dictated by the circumstances. To emphasize the dif­
ference, the adjective "special" was added.
To some member firms, that adjective also implies "something 
not often done." Thus a special review is unusual and from this idea it 
draws attention and concern. Some member firms believe the new 
term also has a negative connotation.
Chapter 6
IMPROVING THE PROCESS
SEC Views on Special Reviews
A consistent criticism voiced by the SEC staff is that the Quality 
Control Inquiry Committee should conduct more special reviews. 
Members of the SEC staff note that peer review emphasizes the design 
o f and compliance with quality control systems, and that if the system 
is satisfactory, then failure must be a "people problem." They argue 
that whenever allegations o f failure, if valid, could indicate serious 
noncompliance with quality controls, a special review should be con­
ducted to assure the public that the problem is not indicative o f a 
pattern o f noncompliance or substandard performance by engage­
ment personnel. If a pattern is found to exist, the solution is to take 
remedial steps to assure that the same person or persons will not 
make the same or other mistakes in the future.
Thus the SEC staff contends that when the circumstances o f a 
reported case suggest that substandard work may have been per­
formed, a special review should be directed at other work o f the au­
ditors concerned to determine whether they should be permitted to 
continue in practice, and, if so, on what terms.
"Internal" Reviews
The discipline inherent in a quality control system should en­
courage firms to make their own "people problem" reviews on an 
internal basis. They should do so without prodding from the QCIC 
whenever they have reason to question the performance o f one or 
more o f their professionals. Such internal reviews should provide the 
most realistic answers to whether the practitioners under scrutiny 
should be permitted to continue in practice. After all, no one has 
more incentive to weed out incompetent practitioners than their 
partners. As we have already noted in the discussion o f the financial 
institutions cases, the SIC during its investigative procedures at times 
becomes aware that such an internal review has occurred and is made
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privy to both the findings and the firm's corrective actions. In such 
instances, review by the SIC o f the documentation o f the internal 
review may obviate the need for a special review or at least enable 
the scope o f a special review to be less comprehensive than it other­
wise would have been.
Special Reviews —  A Considerable Variety
Internal reviews and special reviews have a common purpose. 
Although few in number and varying in nature, the special reviews 
performed to date constitute an interesting and unusual part o f the 
QCIC's activities. Overall they reflect with considerable accuracy the 
evolutionary development o f the committee's policies, practices and 
concerns.
Twelve special reviews have been performed to the date o f this 
writing; they considered the allegations o f 16 reported cases. In view 
o f the number o f firms included in the SEC Practice Section and the 
fact that those firms have reported 382 cases from inception o f the 
SIC through June 30, 1990, one would have difficulty in arguing that 
the committee has ordered special reviews excessively. O f course, it 
should be taken into consideration that a number o f special reviews 
were obviated because the firms in litigation had conducted "internal 
reviews" which, as we noted earlier, closely approximate the require­
ments o f a special review.
The special reviews completed to date vary considerably in the 
circumstances that caused the reviews to be made, in the methods 
followed, in the extent o f QCIC involvement, and in the matters o f 
primary interest. No pattern seems to emerge. Some reviews were 
performed by teams o f qualified experts having no previous associa­
tion with the reviewed firm, either as investigators or as peer review­
ers. Some were performed by members o f the QCIC and its staff. In 
other cases, the firm's peer reviewers undertook the special review 
reporting their activities to the committee. In every case, the commit­
tee both specified the purpose and extent o f the review, and through 
its task force, supervised and reviewed the conduct o f review proce­
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dures and thus satisfied itself that the objective o f the review had 
been attained.
Five o f the twelve reviews have already been discussed; three 
focused on quality controls relating to audit practice in a specialized 
industry, another focused on the firm's quality controls relating to 
complex public engagements in the four offices which conducted two 
engagements in litigation, and the fifth focused on quality controls in 
the office that had conducted an engagement that resulted in litiga­
tion and included audits performed in the same industry as that en­
gagement, including audits performed by the personnel who were 
responsible for it.
Of the remaining seven, three were completed prior to adoption 
by the SIC o f a more structured approach as described later in this 
paper. One focused on office quality controls and included engage­
ments which were conducted by the personnel who supervised the 
engagement in litigation and which had characteristics similar to that 
engagement; another focused on office-wide quality controls and on 
engagements with characteristics similar to and conducted by per­
sonnel who performed four engagements on which audit failure was 
alleged; and the third review involved the evaluation o f quality con­
trols over engagements conducted in various offices on which signifi­
cant portions o f the audits were performed by personnel from other 
CPA firms. The first two o f these resulted in changes in office manage­
ment, additional education, and expanded engagement review proce­
dures. The latter caused the establishment o f additional firm-wide 
quality controls and monitoring procedures as well as the performance 
o f auditing procedures on certain engagements that were included in 
the special review and found to be substandard.
These special reviews were well done and resulted in corrective 
actions by the firms that were clearly in the public interest. Even the 
SEC so acknowledged, having had access to the results o f the three 
reviews just discussed. The concern expressed was why so few spe­
cial reviews had been conducted—particularly reviews o f other audit 
work performed by personnel responsible for conducting an alleg­
edly faulty audit. The threshold for requiring a review seemed to be 
too high.
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Since then, four such reviews have been conducted concerning 
four cases involving as many firms. Two o f these indicated adequate 
compliance with quality controls on other engagements; the cases 
were closed. The third resulted in the finding that one partner's 
workload was too heavy and that additional review procedures should 
be employed over this partner's work because documentation on his 
other audits was deficient in some important respects. And the fourth 
resulted in the finding that the firm's audit guidance relating to the 
consideration o f audit risk and materiality was too complex. There­
fore, that guidance was revised to avoid the possibility o f misunder­
standing by firm personnel.
"People Problem" Reviews
The variety o f special reviews experienced in the past is unlikely 
to continue. Repeated peer reviews tend to strengthen member firms' 
systems o f quality control by eliminating deficiencies in these sys­
tems. People problems, however, will persist. Hence we may expect 
that special reviews in the future will tend to be o f the people problem 
variety.
That focus will meet the SEC's concern described above. The 
QCIC has successfully been experimenting with a form o f special re­
view that satisfactorily accomplishes the SEC's objectives and keeps 
the costs o f reviews down. Such reviews have been conducted by 
competent firm personnel who were not involved in the alleged fail­
ure, and not from the same office, under the immediate supervision 
o f the firm's peer review team captain and ultimate supervision by a 
QCIC task force. The POB has cautioned the QCIC that great pains 
need be taken to reduce the perception problem that this form of 
special review could cause, that is, that the reviewers will not be ob­
jective. Consequently the QCIC has agreed not to use either peer 
reviewer or firm personnel in any situation where their involvement 
in the previous peer review or last inspection would lead to a ques­
tion about their objectivity. When such a question arises, the special 
review should be conducted by a completely independent review team.
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At the time o f this writing, the QCIC is experimenting with a spe­
cial review process that balances objectivity and cost concerns by 
utilizing the following principles:
1. No member o f a special review team should review or opine on 
work or matters on which that member has already reviewed or 
opined.
2. All members o f a review team must be competent and qualified.
3. Special review procedures must be specifically designed to ac­
complish the purpose o f the review.
4. Ultimate responsibility for the quality o f special reviews rests with 
the QCIC.
Appropriate Bases for Sanctions
When the SIC Organizational Document was revised to incorporate 
the Chetkovich Committee recommendations in 1984, an important 
change concerned the matter o f sanctions. The Chetkovich Commit­
tee formally recognized the dominance o f remedy over punishment 
in the work o f the Special Investigations Committee. The revised 
document made it clear that circumstances would rarely be encoun­
tered when the SIC would recommend that the Executive Committee 
sanction a firm. The possibility, o f course, was provided for but would 
likely stem only from a firm's refusal to cooperate in any o f several 
ways:
1. Failure to provide information to the committee.
2. Refusal to undergo a special review as ordered or to pay for one.
3. Failure to take corrective action that is deemed reasonable and 
necessary by the committee.
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Increased Access for the Quality Control Inquiry 
Committee
The revised Organizational Document also recognized the 
committee's need for information more directly relevant to the alle­
gations in the litigation reported to the committee. As suggested pre­
viously, some committee members were more aggressive and perhaps 
more effective in asking member firm representatives the kinds o f 
questions that brought forth useful answers. Such questions sometimes 
went directly to the allegations in the case. Because there was no 
requirement that the firms respond to such questions, sometimes 
the committee members received responses to such questions and 
sometimes they did not.
Members o f the committee felt that they were at a severe disad­
vantage in being totally dependent on the voluntary provision o f in­
formation they needed. Relevant to this point, the Chetkovich Com­
mittee report recommended somewhat ambiguously that member 
firms "...should be required to furnish sufficient information (but not 
the working papers or other direct evidence in a specific case)..."
The revised Organizational Document included the following:
Consideration of the nature and implications of the allegations ... 
which may involve meetings with representatives of the firm to 
discuss the allegations made, the quality control policies and 
procedures presently in effect, the corrective actions, if any, that 
have been taken by the firm, and the results of regular or special 
inspections undertaken by the firm.
This revision strengthened the committee's freedom to ask questions 
related to the case before it, a substantial improvement from the early 
days o f the committee when such questions would likely have been 
rejected. Nevertheless, this did not provide the committee with as 
much access to information about the case at hand as some members 
o f the committee thought they needed to perform their task expedi­
tiously and equitably to all member firms. Consequently, the evolu­
tion in committee access to "case specific" information was not to 
stop here.
Improving the Process 45
Increased Scope o f QCIC's Jurisdiction
A major recommendation in the Chetkovich report was introduced 
as follows:
...we believe it is time to reconsider the requirement that only 
litigation involving SEC registrants be reported.
A quality control deficiency that results in an audit failure relating 
to a client that is not an SEC registrant could, in the absence of 
some additional special safeguards, have the same result in con­
nection with the audit of an SEC registrant. The committee, in the 
past, has added to its agenda a limited number of cases involving 
entities that are not SEC registrants. Because of the construction 
of the reporting requirement, it was found necessary in such in­
stances to approach the firms involved and encourage them to 
report such matters voluntarily.
Although that approach worked in those instances, the efficacy of 
the process and the public credibility it obtains would be enhanced 
if the reporting requirement was broadened. Ideally, it could be 
argued that all alleged audit failures should be reported; however, 
since the primary thrust of the SECPS relates to the improvement 
of the quality of practice before the SEC, we conclude that the 
requirement should be broadened to include cases involving en­
tities, that although not SEC registrants, are of such interest to the 
general and financial public that a distinction between them and 
SEC registrants should not be made.
The recommendation reads as follows:
The membership requirement for reporting cases to the Special 
Investigations Committee should be extended to cover cases in­
volving all entities in which there is a significant public interest.
This recommendation was implemented in the revised Organiza­
tional Document with these words:
The committee may identify a significant public interest in an al­
leged audit failure that is not required to be reported to the com­
mittee. The executive committee shall determine what actions, if 
any, shall be taken by the Section with respect to such matters.
That recommendation was also reflected in the membership re­
quirements as a "redefinition" o f an SEC client. The revised definition
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recognized the substantial public interest in the quality o f audits of 
banks, savings and loan institutions, and some other entities that do 
not file with the SEC. As noted previously, some cases o f this type 
had been voluntarily reported to the SIC. The revised requirement 
called for reporting cases that allege failure to audit properly the fi­
nancial statements o f a bank or other lending institution that periodi­
cally files with a regulatory body and meets certain size tests.
In June 1989, concern for the public interest led the SECPS Ex­
ecutive Committee to grant the QCIC the right to inquire into litiga­
tion initiated against auditors by regulators alleging audit failure in 
the conduct o f an audit o f any financial institution. This further ex­
pansion o f the QCIC process recognized that a significant number o f 
complaints, particularly involving failed S & L's were being filed by 
regulators which were not reportable to the QCIC even under the re­
definition.
The Continuing Search for Credibility
Credibility is a combination o f an appropriate and well defined 
mission, a good program to accomplish that mission, and actual per­
formance subject to independent review or testing. Because o f the 
possibility o f serious damage to member firms' litigation defenses, 
the work o f the Quality Control Inquiry Committee is highly confiden­
tial. This makes obtaining general credibility for the QCIC difficult in­
deed. What people know nothing about is unlikely to impress them 
as credible. So an effort has been made to establish credibility for the 
QCIC in another way. If the SEC, an objective and independent body, 
can test the activities o f the QCIC and find they performed satisfacto­
rily, then the SEC's endorsement o f the QCIC's activities may provide 
adequate credibility. In effect, SEC's endorsement has assumed the 
status o f public credibility.
In May 1985, at the urging o f the POB, the Section agreed that 
the activities o f the Special Investigations Committee should be re­
ported to the SEC with the POB staff acting as intermediary. In a ma­
jo r departure from the Section's policy on confidentiality, this pro­
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posal gave the SEC staff information about each case including iden­
tification o f the audit firm and the audit client. For each case the SEC 
staff received a summary o f (a) the major allegations, (b) the investi­
gative procedures applied by the committee, (c) the results thereby 
obtained, and (d) any subsequent actions of the committee (the "closed 
case summary"). The SEC staff was also given access to the POB's 
completed oversight checklist and the POB staff made itself available 
to respond candidly to SEC staff questions about the QCIC's actions 
and findings and the POB's oversight.
The first such access by the SEC staff was provided from June 30 
to July 2, 1986 when the SEC staff reviewed 24 closed case summa­
ries and discussed those cases with the POB staff. From the stand­
point o f relations with the SEC staff, this session marked a new level. 
Questions were wide-ranging but relevant and responses were can­
did.
Even though this first exchange o f information had been a sig­
nificant departure from earlier positions taken, it was not sufficient 
for the SEC staff to endorse the QCIC process. Yet the SEC staff now 
had observed at first hand that the special investigative program was 
one o f substance and quality.
SEC Reluctance to Endorse the Process
The SEC staff expressed three concerns about the QCIC process 
subsequent to this first access experience. First, the SEC staff ques­
tioned whether the QCIC's credibility could ever be established if it 
focused solely on remedial measures to the exclusion o f punitive 
considerations. Second, the SEC staff thought that the QCIC needed 
to have access to selected workpapers o f the audits under litigation 
to evaluate the effectiveness o f applicable quality controls and com­
pliance with them. Third, the QCIC should lower its threshold for per­
forming special reviews, especially when questions arise concerning 
the quality o f work o f the auditors responsible for the audits in ques­
tion.
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Soon thereafter, the members o f the POB met in open session 
with the SEC commissioners. Among the matters discussed was the 
role o f the Special Investigations Committee, the fact that it did not 
yet have the endorsement o f the SEC, and the paucity o f publicly 
available information about SIC operations and accomplishments. 
During the meeting, SEC Chairman John Shad expressed his opinion 
that the SIC's credibility was crucial to determining whether the 
profession's self-regulatory program was effective. He urged the Sec­
tion and the POB to find a way to inform the public about the role and 
operation o f the SIC.
Commissioner Peters urged that the SIC be given access to more 
information about specific alleged audit failures to further assure its 
effectiveness in improving the quality o f audits performed by Section 
members. It was clear from the general tone o f the meeting that these 
were matters o f some urgency. The POB agreed to exercise its best 
efforts to improve the disclosure o f SIC/QCIC activities, especially to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and also to gain for the 
QCIC more direct information about alleged audit failures.
Some Complexities in the Credibility Issue
The Quality Control Inquiry Committee's credibility problem must 
be seen as a mix o f variables, each o f which can be viewed from 
different and not unreasonable points o f view. To be accepted as a 
valid part o f the self-regulatory process, the QCIC had to establish its 
effectiveness in serving the public interest. The imposed requirement 
o f confidentiality made evaluation o f the QCIC's work by ''outsiders'' 
impossible. What did the QCIC do? Only the insiders knew. How well 
did it perform? Only the insiders had direct access to QCIC activities. 
The procedure for reporting and discussing closed case summaries 
was designed to provide an adequate understanding o f both the QCIC's 
activities and the quality o f its work to the SEC staff. The SEC staff 
found it an improvement but initially at least not totally satisfactory 
for the purpose.
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Yet stripping the QCIC o f confidentiality to provide the SEC staff 
with more detail could expose the firms to risks in litigation that they 
considered totally unacceptable. The continuing advice o f legal coun­
sel could not be ignored.
The QCIC continues to face more than one interpretation o f its 
function. A regulatory point o f view tends to emphasize identification 
and punishment o f those who fail their duties. As one critic o f the 
QCIC expressed it: "That's what regulators do." And the QCIC is the 
only element in the SEC Practice Section's program that deals with 
allegations o f audit failure. If it fails to identify and punish, who will? 
How can the QCIC then be accepted as an important link in the self- 
regulatory process if it never identifies or punishes anyone as a wrong­
doer?
But as noted previously, the members o f the SEC Practice Sec­
tion have a different view of the role o f the self-regulatory program. 
They contend that the program best serves the public interest by go­
ing directly to weaknesses in the quality control systems of member 
firms and eliminating those weaknesses. Ho one else can do that as 
well as they. But others —  the legal system and legally supported 
regulators —  are both better equipped and better able to carry out 
the "identify and punish" aspects o f regulation.
There are also strikingly different views on the cost o f the self- 
regulatory program. Regulators tend to have little interest in cost, es­
pecially costs that do not impinge on their own budgets. Practitioners 
have a vital interest in cost. Anything that increases their cost o f op­
erations must be borne either by clients or reduce partner profits, 
either o f which poses serious problems. The minimum costs o f the 
self-regulatory program are considerable: peer reviews, second part­
ner reviews on all SEC client audits, annual internal inspection pro­
grams, and special reviews. The prospect o f incurring costs in self­
regulation that may result in sustaining losses from litigation is both 
ironic and remarkably unappealing.
Finally, professional pride is a matter o f no small consequence. 
Regulators have little inhibition about calling for additional require­
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ments to protect the public. What could be more important? Their 
investigations into alleged and real misdeeds convince them of the 
necessity o f those requirements. Practitioners, on the other hand, see 
themselves as serving faithfully and effectively in an honorable and 
useful activity. The overwhelming majority o f them have served 
throughout their careers without ever having been charged with audit 
failure. They and their firms have a responsibility to meet client needs 
at reasonable cost. How much of this expensive self-regulation is really 
needed?
Public Oversight Board Interest in QCIC Credibility
The Public Oversight Board has a keen interest in the matter o f 
QCIC credibility. In the first place, any weakness in QCIC credibility 
raises questions about the entire self-regulatory program. The QCIC 
was proposed and is recognized as necessary to supplement the peer 
review process. The review of engagements in a peer review is per­
formed on a sampling basis. If enough bad cases occur in spite o f 
peer review, and if nothing is done about them, then peer review will 
be found unsatisfactory.
Second, the QCIC was not patterned on any existing professional 
model. Rather it was an innovation which the POB has supported en­
thusiastically. The POB and the profession's leadership both recog­
nized that a self-regulatory program that omitted review o f alleged 
audit failures would not be accepted by Congress and other critics.
QCIC activities were not in the nature o f a normal practitioner 
response. Peer review was sufficiently similar to internal inspection 
programs to be understandable and accepted. Special investigation 
activity smacked o f outside interference, regulation, and building a 
case against the firm. The POB sees a real need for the QCIC to suc­
ceed. At the same time, the POB has no desire to increase the litigation 
risk to member firms unreasonably.
Also, the Board feels pressure from both the Securities and Ex­
change Commission and from member firms to bring this issue to a 
satisfactory resolution. The subject o f QCIC credibility is always on
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the agenda when the Board meets with the Commission. Likewise, it 
also is a subject frequently discussed when the Board meets with the 
Executive Committee o f the SEC Practice Section or the AICPA Board 
o f Directors.
POB Efforts to Resolve the Credibility Issue
Partly to help resolve the QCIC credibility issue and partly through 
its general oversight activities, the Public Oversight Board generated 
three proposals we believe bear positively on the matter o f QCIC 
credibility.
The Concept o f Incremental Risk. First, and primarily the result 
o f a staff effort, the concept o f incremental risk was proposed and 
investigated. We have already noted the great concern o f member 
firms and their counsels regarding possible prejudice to the firms in 
litigation. Class action suits, joint and several liability, RICO and the 
generally litigious environment in which accounting firms serve com­
bine to make allegations o f audit failure difficult to defend. Informa­
tion obtained through any investigatory activities o f the QCIC may be 
found useful by plaintiffs attorneys. "Why should we make their case 
for them?" is the way one managing partner expressed his views.
With full understanding o f this strongly held view, the POB staff 
raised an interesting question. Given the fact that rules o f discovery 
and the admissibility o f evidence provide certain conditions within 
which plaintiff constructs a case, how much would the risk o f failure 
to successfully defend against that case be increased by giving the 
QCIC some limited access to information about the case?
Would plaintiff have access to QCIC documents? Would that ac­
cess provide any help to plaintiff not already provided by complete 
access to the audit workpapers for the case and depositions o f audit 
engagement personnel? Could QCIC members be forced to testify? 
Would they be required to offer opinions on fault if their investigation 
ran only to the possibility o f systemic design or compliance deficien­
cies and not to fault in performance o f the audit?
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Expert research and advice were sought and obtained. The ques­
tion o f a public policy exception was explored. Grounds for the ex­
ception were that the self-regulatory program of the profession could 
not operate without the cooperation of member firms who likely would 
not provide information to the QCIC which could be discovered and 
used at trial against them. The calling o f expert witnesses and the fact 
that anything QCIC members could derive from audit workpapers 
would already be available from other sources was also inquired into.
The result o f this research provided no final answer. Too many of 
the questions are subject to broad judicial discretion or have not yet 
been litigated. Although those involved, both litigators and non­
litigators, were willing to express informed opinions, as lawyers they 
were experienced enough to emphasize that what we received were 
opinions only with no assurance o f ultimate vindication.
Yet the concept o f incremental risk itself was useful in helping to 
get the problem into perspective and in increasing the understanding 
o f those concerned.
In the final analysis, with adoption o f the QCIC program, mem­
ber firms accepted the risk that QCIC conclusions and any corrective 
actions required thereby may be subject to discovery. Thus, expansion 
o f QCIC's investigative process to encompass review o f selected 
workpapers or interview o f engagement personnel would represent, 
as counsel noted, "only a change in degree o f potential risk" to SECPS 
firms.
Proposal fo r  a More Structured Approach fo r the QCIC. The cases 
reported to the QCIC by member firms in compliance with the Sec­
tion membership requirements vary significantly from the vague to 
the specific, from highly visible to relatively unimportant, and from 
complex to straightforward. The QCIC investigation o f those cases 
varies with the aggressiveness, experience, and ingenuity o f the QCIC 
member assigned to the case and with the responsiveness o f the 
member firm.
The crucial question in every case is when to close. At what point 
and based on what evidence should the committee conclude that
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further investigation is not warranted. In theory, the answer to that 
question is: when the committee concludes that no corrective action 
needs to be taken regarding the firm's quality controls or the compli­
ance o f its personnel with those controls. Yet because o f the variety 
o f cases and o f investigative approaches, some unevenness between 
cases is difficult to avoid.
Observation by the POB staff o f QCIC action in dealing with ap­
proximately 200 reported cases convinced the staff that QCIC activity 
could be improved and cases could be given more even treatment if 
a more structured and positive approach were adopted.
The structure was provided by a sequence o f procedures, each 
one leading logically to the next:
Analysis
Inquiry
Investigative procedures
Special review
Analysis comprehended a reading o f the allegations, the financial 
statements to which they relate, and any other material readily avail­
able to determine if the plaintiff's charges are sufficiently specific and 
relevant to have quality control implications. If not, a recommenda­
tion for closing the case was in order.
Inquiry provided for direct contact with the member firm to seek 
answers to questions raised by the quality control implications found 
in the analysis phase. Questions might run to whether the audit in 
question had been included in the most recent peer review and in­
spection programs, how the firm felt about the allegations, the firm's 
risk evaluation o f the client, and similar matters. If responses to these 
questions could allay the QCIC member's concerns about quality 
control, a recommendation for closing the case was in order; otherwise 
the case would be held open and subjected to investigative procedures.
Investigative procedures involved further inquiries more directly 
related to the case and the qualifications o f the audit team, discussion 
with the peer reviewers, examination o f inspection reports, reading
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available regulatory reports, following up on questions raised by the 
media, and the like.
The investigation phase comes to a conclusion when the QCIC 
member assigned to the case recommends either that the case be 
closed or that a special review be undertaken. When a case has been 
carried this far, the other members o f the committee have become 
familiar with it and the task force's recommendation will be the sub­
ject o f comprehensive committee discussion.
Special reviews might be directed to other engagements by per­
sonnel who supervised the allegedly faulty audit, to selected engage­
ments in the same industry on an office or firm-wide basis, to engage­
ments with unique transactions, to a review o f quality control 
compliance by one or more offices, or to a review o f the entire system 
(a peer review).
The positive element in pursuing this structured approach is one 
o f attitude. The task force assigned to the case continues with the 
current or next step in the process until satisfied that there is nothing 
to be gained by continuing further. That is, the evidence available is 
sufficient to persuade him that nothing significant is to be accom­
plished in the way o f public protection by continuing the inquiry.
Discussion with House Counsels. The third contribution by the 
FOB to resolve the issue o f QCIC credibility was a roundtable discus­
sion o f that issue with the house counsels o f a number o f the larger 
member firms called by the chairman o f the Public Oversight Board. 
He felt that a frank discussion with these people, whose advice to the 
chief executive officers o f the member firms carried such weight, would 
be enlightening to all concerned. The response was encouraging.
Ho record or minutes o f any kind were kept. The discussion was 
frank and open. Concerns were considered and the concept o f incre­
mental risk was explained and discussed. The importance o f QCIC 
credibility, a matter not likely to come to the attention o f the house 
counsels, was also explained and discussed at length. The house 
counsels made no secret o f their determination to protect their firms 
from unnecessary litigation risks. They saw that as a first responsibil­
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ity. At the same time, they indicated an appreciation for the impor­
tance o f a self-regulatory program that made additional regulation un­
necessary. The subject o f QCIC access to selected audit workpapers 
for cases under investigation was discussed at some length.
No action was taken at the meeting nor was any anticipated. A 
frank airing o f views was deemed to be useful. There is little doubt 
that all present departed with a fuller understanding o f the dangers 
that others saw in the various courses o f action discussed.
Chapter 7
ADDITIONAL EFFORTS TO IMPROVE THE
PROCESS
The Rossi Task Force
As a result o f its meeting with the Securities and Exchange Com­
mission on July 29, 1986, the POB requested the SEC Practice Sec­
tion to reconsider (1) providing the QCIC access to selected audit 
workpapers and (2) relaxing the confidentiality surrounding its activi­
ties in order to strengthen QCIC's effectiveness and credibility. The 
Section responded in September o f that year by appointing a task 
force to review QCIC methodology. The chairman, Frank Rossi, was 
joined on the task force by a fellow SEC Practice Section Executive 
Committee member, two QCIC members, and the general counsels 
o f two firms.
The task force met with representatives o f a number o f firms 
having large SEC practices, the Chief Accountant o f the SEC and his 
staff, representatives o f the POB, and members o f the SIC/QCIC. On 
April 3, 1987, the task force issued its report, "Enhancing the Effec­
tiveness and Credibility o f the SIC Activities."
The SEC Practice Section's Executive Committee accepted the 
task force's report at a special meeting in April 1987. The major con­
clusions included the following:
• The mission o f the committee should not be changed; it should 
continue to complement the peer review process by evaluating 
the quality control implications o f alleged audit failures.
• The committee should adopt a more structured approach in act­
ing on reported cases.
• QCIC task forces should be permitted to access, when appropri­
ate, selected audit documentation prepared in the course o f per­
forming the audit in question.
• The SEC should be provided with more meaningful reports o f the 
actions and findings o f the committee on reported cases.
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QCIC representatives should meet periodically with the SEC Chief 
Accountant and members o f his staff to enhance the SEC's gen­
eral understanding o f the committee's activities.
Results of the Task Force's Recommendations
In June 1987, the Executive Committee modified the QCIC Or­
ganizational Document with the following additions:
I. The following provision was added to paragraph 17 in the sec­
tion entitled "Investigative Procedures:" The SIC, when it deems 
it appropriate and necessary, should read audit documentation, 
such as audit planning memoranda, summary review memoranda, 
audit issues memoranda, or consultation memoranda, that could 
enable the SIC to evaluate whether appropriate attention was 
given by appropriate individuals during the audit to the issues 
addressed by the allegations.’2 However, while access should be 
sufficient for the SIC to evaluate whether the member firm had 
suitable quality controls and whether they were operating effec­
tively, the SIC's review should not be so extensive as to place it 
in a position to determine whether or not the firm had specifi­
cally complied with generally accepted auditing standards in the 
area under consideration. The exact extent, nature, and form o f 
access requested depends on the individual circumstances pre­
sented by the specific case and the specific allegations.
II. The next paragraph o f the aforementioned section was amended 
to read as follows:
2A member firm will ordinarily evaluate the litigation risk against the benefit of 
permitting the SIC access on a specific case. Accordingly, a decision not to permit 
access to documentation does not necessarily mean that inappropriate attention 
was given to a matter. That decision would not, in and of itself, cause the SIC to 
recommend the imposition of sanctions, provided the firm's decision was not a 
general refusal to cooperate. The inability to review important evidence of quality 
controls would likely result in a more extensive investigation than would otherwise 
be required, including the greater likelihood of a special review. Furthermore, a 
general refusal to cooperate in the investigative process would cause the SIC to 
recommend sanctions.
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A firm is required to cooperate with the committee by furnishing 
on a timely basis, upon request, the information contemplated 
by paragraph 17 and by authorizing its peer reviewers to comply 
with requests for such information. A firm is also ordinarily ex­
pected to cooperate with requests to permit SIC access, when 
appropriate, to certain audit documentation bearing upon the 
member firm's awareness and consideration o f the issues ad­
dressed by allegations made against the firm. However, a firm is 
not required to provide the committee or its representative with 
information that would invade the attorney-client privilege, or with 
the litigation work product o f the firm or any o f its partners or 
employees.
Adoption o f Working Procedures. The QCIC has adopted working 
procedures that include implementation o f the more structured and 
positive approach initially proposed by the FOB staff and included in 
the Rossi Task Force recommendations.
Access to Selected Audit Workpapers Has Been Requested and 
Provided. Since the revisions to the Organizational Document were 
made, the QCIC has requested and was provided access to selected 
workpapers as part o f its investigative procedures on numerous cases. 
Ho instance o f outright refusal by a firm to provide such access on 
request has been encountered.
Development o f Closed Case Summaries. Since July 1986, when 
the SEC staff had access for the first time to closed case summaries 
and the opportunity to discuss the cases with the POB staff, they have 
done so nine times and have reviewed in the process approximately 
180 summaries. As with other aspects o f the QCIC process, the detail 
o f the committee's considerations and conclusions on individual cases 
as contained in the closed case summaries prepared by AICPA staff 
members has evolved.
Early attempts at such summaries were described as o f little use 
by SEC staff members who were quick to observe that their only basis 
for evaluating the QCIC's action on individual cases was the "case 
summary." In their opinion, the summary provided too little informa-
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tion to enable them to meaningfully pose challenging questions for 
the purpose o f evaluating the SIC process.
Continuing efforts to expand the summaries were met with criti­
cism by the firms involved and their house counsels. At times, those 
involved in preparing the summaries were near despair concerning 
the prospects o f satisfying both the firms and the SEC staff. The Rossi 
Task Force recommended in April 1987 expanding the closed case 
summaries to describe the specific issues considered by the QCIC, 
including the attention given to relevant SEC pronouncements, and 
to indicate the types o f audit documentation reviewed, interviews 
conducted, decisions (if any) not to permit access to requested infor­
mation and the basis for the QCIC's conclusions. As a result, although 
the format o f the summary remained the same, the degree o f detail 
expanded over the next two years o f SEC staff access. By September 
1989, the SEC staff had noted a major improvement in the informa­
tion provided them and indicated a willingness to enter into a dia­
logue with officials o f the SECPS and the POB concerning possible 
endorsement.
That month, an SECPS task force proposal to make the closed 
case summary an even more informative document for SEC staff 
oversight was accepted by the SECPS Executive Committee. The "new 
summary" would more clearly explain the QCIC action on a case in a 
five-step format:
• Background information on the registrant
• Litigation
• Summary o f allegations
• QCIC procedures and conclusions
• Decision to close case.
The allegations o f a case were to be specifically related to quality 
control issues to avoid any implication that the committee was ad­
dressing the merits o f the allegations per se. The result would be a 
slightly expanded risk in litigation to member firms if the summary
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were discoverable by plaintiff's bar. Recognizing, however, that the 
summary would only be retained for thirty days from the date the SEC 
staff was notified o f its availability, the risk was deemed not inordi­
nate, and was worth taking to obtain the SEC's endorsement o f the 
process. Such endorsement would add immeasurably to the credibility 
o f the process.
In February 1990, the SEC staff reviewed thirty-one case summa­
ries in the new format and discussed them with POB and Institute 
staffs. In March 1990, SEC Chief Accountant Coulson and his staff 
met with SECPS officials and POB representatives to provide the staff's 
reactions to the new summary. The SEC staff's reaction was most 
positive. Based on the information provided, the staff had concluded 
that the QCIC process provides added assurance, as a supplement to 
the peer review process, that major quality control deficiencies in the 
SECPS members firms’ quality control systems, if any, are identified 
and delivered in a more timely fashion.
Sharing the SEC staff's convictions concerning the importance 
o f "internal reviews" performed by firms which focus on possible 
"people problems" (see SEC Views on Special Reviews and "Internal" 
Reviews on page 45), the Executive Committee o f the SEC Practice 
Section in September 1990 approved a procedure recommended by 
the QCIC and endorsed by the POB whereby a firm would be requested 
in certain cases to perform a timely inspection o f audits o f specific 
personnel whose work has been alleged in litigation to be substan­
dard. This possibility would exist when QCIC analysis and in-depth 
inquiry leave open the possibility that engagement personnel may 
not have fully complied with their firm's system o f quality control. 
The decision to request such an inspection would be one made by 
the entire QCIC after taking into account the information the committee 
has gathered through the application o f its investigative procedures. 
The committee will explain in the closed case summary the consider­
ation it gave to invoking this new procedure whenever a case is closed 
in the investigative (in-depth inquiry) phase.
In addition, the POB is considering an SEC staff request to pro­
vide more narrative information concerning its oversight o f QCIC ac­
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tivity on individual cases in its oversight workpapers which are acces­
sible to the SEC staff. Before reaching a decision, the Board is care­
fully weighing the SEC's need for such documentation to evaluate the 
process and the possible adverse effect such documentation might 
have on the member firms' rights concerning their legal defenses.
Chapter 8
CONTRASTING VIEWS OF THE QUALITY 
CONTROL INQUIRY COMMITTEE
As Seen by the POB
A review o f the documentary evidence showing the evolution o f 
the QCIC during its ten years o f activity plus an intimate acquaintance 
with its activity and procedures lead to the following conclusions.
1. The committee has come a long way; it serves a useful and vital 
role in the self-regulatory process.
2. It has not exceeded reasonable use o f the powers extended to it.
3. Member firms have, som e very reluctantly, increased the 
committee's powers from time to time until these far exceed 
anything contemplated at the time o f its establishment.
4. Based on the extent and quality o f its work, the QCIC has earned 
credibility as an essential and effective part o f the self-regulatory 
program. Endorsement by the SEC is certainly desirable but in 
no way essential to its importance and effectiveness.
The success o f the QCIC lies in its emphasis on the public inter­
est in improving audit service through the elimination o f quality con­
trol deficiencies and identification o f professional standards which 
need reconsideration. It has wisely avoided the task for which it is not 
adequately qualified or well designed, the identification o f fault and 
imposition o f punishment, although it has not hesitated to recom­
mend investigation o f the work o f specific individuals by the AICPA's 
Professional Ethics Division. A review of a summary o f the results o f 
QCIC activity in carefully considering the implications o f 349 cases 
from inception, November 1, 1979, through June 30, 1990, amply 
demonstrates the vital role that the committee has come to play in 
the self-regulatory program.
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Results of SIC/QCIC Activity
Number o f Actions
ACTIONS RELATED TO FIRMS
A special review was made or the firm's
regularly scheduled peer review was expanded........  38
The firm took appropriate corrective measures 
that were responsive to the implications o f the 
specific c a s e ................................................................  53
ACTIONS RELATED TO STANDARDS
Appropriate AICPA technical bodies were asked 
to consider the need for changes in, or 
additional guidance on, professional 
standards...................................................................... 36
ACTIONS RELATED TO INDIVIDUALS
The case was referred to the AICPA Professional 
Ethics Division with a recommendation for an 
investigation into the work o f specific individuals .... 14
141
Note: Frequently, more than one action is taken by the QCIC or the 
firm in a single case.
The Public Oversight Board has repeatedly complimented the 
Quality Control Inquiry Committee on the quality o f its performance 
o f an important and difficult task. But quality and credibility differ. 
Many important and difficult tasks are performed valiantly without 
public notice or recognition. So it is with the QCIC. Operating as it 
must in complete confidentiality, there is no opportunity for the public 
to learn o f its work or to grant the QCIC the credibility it deserves.
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As Seen by the Member Firms
Member firms tend to see the QCIC as a latent threat and a very 
real concern. The hazards o f practice in a litigious environment un­
avoidably make firm management and in-house counsel reluctant to 
participate in any effort, however worthy, that might increase litiga­
tion risk. Because QCIC activities are confidential, few members o f 
any firm have direct knowledge o f the quality and nature o f QCIC 
personnel or activities. Questions such as why certain information is 
needed, how it will be used, and what precautions are taken to keep 
it confidential, if asked, can seldom be answered in specific terms. 
Hence there is a natural reluctance on the part o f the firms to volun­
teer information. On the contrary, the general feeling is that the less 
we have to do with the QCIC, the better. A constant fear exists that 
the committee may fail to see the danger to a defendant firm in the 
information that has come to its attention.
As Seen by the SEC Staff
An SEC staff member, concerned with regulation, is unlikely to 
have great enthusiasm for confidentiality and the destruction o f 
records. Full and fair disclosure o f all information obtained, no limi­
tation on questions that might be asked or leads that might be pursued, 
and a deemphasis on the audit firm's interests compared with the 
public interest are expected. How is the SEC staff to know whether 
the QCIC personnel asked all the questions they should have asked, 
pursued every lead to a satisfactory conclusion, and overlooked no 
possibilities o f deficient auditing?
A Reconciliation of Views
Given these different points o f view, one need not be surprised 
that the SEC has had difficulty in "endorsing" the QCIC process. 
Through the efforts o f the SEC Practice Section and the POB, originally 
expressed concerns about this process were eliminated. The value o f 
a QCIC whose vision was focused on remedial rather than punitive
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measures became clearer to the SEC. The granting to the QCIC by the 
Executive Committee o f the right to access selected audit documen­
tation relating to audits under litigation eliminated still another con­
cern o f the Commission about the effectiveness o f the committee's 
process. Finally, the lowering o f the threshold for special reviews in 
combination with the recently adopted procedure for the conduct of 
"internal reviews" by member firms at the QCIC's request when 
questions arise concerning the quality o f work o f the auditors respon­
sible for the audits in question, has virtually eliminated another o f the 
SEC's concerns. (See SEC Reluctance to Endorse the Process on page 
50.)
Information contained in 180 closed case summaries, which have 
recently been expanded in information content, has persuaded the 
SEC staff that firms have taken quality control corrective actions in 
response to QCIC recommendations including transfer, termination 
and remedial training o f personnel. The SEC staff is also aware that 
professional standards have been improved as a result o f QCIC rec­
ommendations.
Because the QCIC deals with sensitive litigation matters that re­
quire strict confidentiality, it has been difficult to reach an accommo­
dation with the SEC Chief Accountant's office in a way that respects 
both the concerns o f member firms and the Chief Accountant's need 
for information. Thus it is truly significant that the Chief Accountant 
o f the SEC has indicated that his staff has received sufficient informa­
tion to conclude that the QCIC process provides added assurance, as 
a supplement to the SECPS peer review program, that major quality 
control deficiencies, if any, are identified and addressed in a more 
timely fashion, and thus the QCIC process benefits the public inter­
est.
In our view, both the QCIC and the SEC staff are to be com­
mended for the diligence with which each has pursued its goals. The 
two organizations have different purposes and these are pursued in 
different ways. Neither can substitute for the other. Both are necessary. 
Based on our own rather intimate experience with QCIC personnel 
and activities, we have no reluctance in citing it as a remarkable and
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remarkably effective effort by the members o f the SEC Practice Sec­
tion to provide the public with the quality o f service that the public 
deserves. Would that all professions might do as well.
APPENDIX
INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE SERVED ON THE 
QUALITY CONTROL INQUIRY COMMITTEE
From Inception Through June 30, 1990
Thomas E. Byrne, Jr.
Period o f Service 
1987-Present
David C. Cargill 1990-Present
Mark J. Feingold 1980-1986
Edwin P. Fisher 1979-1985
Mario J. Formichella 1986-Present
Robert E. Fleming 1985-Present
John J. Fox 1983-1988
James L. Goble 1987-Present
Gerald E. Gorans 1983-1987
William D. Hall, Chairman 1987-Present 1987-Present
John G. Henderson 1985-1987
Joseph Herbst 1985-1987
Thomas B. Hogan 1980-1983
George M. Horn 1985-Present
James I. Konkel 1989-Present
Harry L. Laing 1979-1983
Rholan E. Larson, Chairman 1979-1981 1979-1981
Leroy Layton 1979-1985
Charles W. Maurer 1988-Present
Robert A. Mellin, Chairman 1981-1987 1981-1987
J. David Moxley 1987-1988
Leon P. Otkiss 1979-1985
John B. O'Hara 1979-1983
Larry J. Parsons 1988-Present
Harry F. Reiss, Jr. 1979-1980
Lawrence J. Seidman 1979-1980
Fred S. Spindell 1990-Present
David Wentworth 1979-1985
Joseph A. Zulfer 1983-1988
